Eric Herboso ([info]ericjherboso) wrote,
@ 2008-02-15 01:42:00
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My Thoughts on Science (& a Bit on Religion, too)
I always have such a tough time explaining how I think to other people. No one ever seems to be able to follow my train of thought no matter how hard I try to explain myself, and I consistently end up thinking that maybe there's some part of me that is crazy in a way that is obvious to others but is completely invisible to me.

As I write this, I think I am undergoing a process that is wholly indescribable in the limited vocabulary I now possess (though my rss subscription to Erin McKean is slowly fixing this problem). I am, I think, falling in love with science, even as I abhor further and further the idea of 'science' that I held as a child. I'll try to explain.

As a child, I was taught the scientific method: observe, hypothesize, test, conclude, repeat. It was presented to me as a way of approaching truth in our world. Through science, we get closer and closer to the true reality, and although at any given point in history we are incorrect on the specifics of how things work, at each successive stage we get closer and closer to what is real. (I.e., in Newton's day we had strong knowledge of classical physics, which was correct to a certain degree of fine-tuning; then came quantum physics which gives identical solutions as classical physics in the aggregate, but gave better knowledge when the fine tuning was tuned ever finer.)

I really did trust in this way of thinking for a long while, and I know many (if not most) current scientists agree with this conception of what science is. It is, after all, what was taught to me in school, and what I read in the science for laymen books of my childhood.

But today, as a philosopher, I find such a conception to be slightly naive. Science, in my eyes, may or may not be building ever closer to the real theory of reality. But that's not the point. The point is to find what works, and to go with it.

Scientists do science by taking showers in the morning, sleeping at night, or meditating in the afternoon. Great discoveries are found through inductive reasoning, which they then reconstruct deductively in order to write a paper that will convince fellow scientists. The art of science is very different from the linear logical argument you'll find in most peer-reviewed papers. When I first realized this, I thought it a crisis for science, because it seemed to really contradict the idea of science as it was taught to me as a child. The true scientific method differed so much from what I recall from my old science textbooks.

But in the end none of this matters. What matters in science is not how an idea is arrived at. What matters is that the idea is tested and thrown out if it disagrees with experiment.

In essence, science is a negatively defined discipline.

What makes science great is that you can take a testable hypthesis, test it, and when it breaks you get rid of it in some fashion. Historically, we've 'gotten rid of' old theories by keeping them mostly intact and adding in a few bulges and denting in a few kinks so that they continue to correspond with experiment. Eventually, the theory becomes so convoluted that it is deemed better to start with a fairly clean theory that looks similar to the old one, but has a few fundamental differences. But the point is that none of this matters. The important bit is that, over time, we eventually prove such and such wrong and move on to something else. Because we're human, we happen to pick a new thing to replace it that is as similar as possible to the old idea. But it really could be whatever we wanted, so long as it, too, fit the data we have available. In fact, the only theoretical benefit of having a current theory that is favored over others is that we can then, as a group, all simultaneously work on figuring out why this one idea is wrong. (As opposed to, say, each scientist holding a different theory that they then attempt to disprove. Also, it should be mentioned that a nontheoretical benefit to having a single favored theory is that it makes iteasier to communicate with each other--another is that it allows nonscientists to have a worldview from which engineers can come up with useful contraptions and the like.)

Science, in this higher level negative sense of the word, is a beautiful, beautiful thing. But the science taught in public school in Alabama is ugly and dogmatic; it is arbitrary rule-making for no good reason. If you want to be a truly good physicist, you need to NOT learn the model, but to knowthe DATA. Models are good as a memorization aide. Models are good as a starting point to create hypotheses. But ALL that matters is the data.

I say this even though models have had some particularly good hits in the past. Newton models gravity, and reality turns out to follow it to a degree of accuracy far beyond the data Newton originally had access to, simply because he went with the solution that seemed most elegant, and nature just so happened to comply. Another example is the atom, modeled as a physical item rather than just a set of properties that could easily have fit the data we had back then just as well. Then further properties of the hypthesized atom were derived which then corresponded to nature once again, showing that the model was in fact closer to reality than my earlier paragraphs seem to imply they usually are.

But in science, as in life, it is often the case that we recognize the hits while forgetting the misses. Especially in science, since we get so used to recording both hits and misses (at least in nonparapsychology studies) that we forget that we aren't recording data when models break down the way we do when we break down those models. And the truth is that most models do in fact break down with nature not being so kind as she was with the gravity model or the atom model.

Anyway, my point is that whatever models we now have, no matter what it is (evolution, gravity, black holes, stars, blood circulation) is most likely fundamentally WRONG. Just think about it: the data we have right now on, say, blood circulation, is pretty extensive. The data is (as far as I know) very good, and the current model we have does an extremely good job of intuitively explaining this data in a way that makes logical sense. But there are an infinite number of alternative models that might also fit those same exact data points, and most of them are extremely dissimilar to the current model of blood circulation that we now hold as gospel.

Scientifically, in the old sense of the word, it makes sense to me why we should keep the model we now have. It makes teaching students easier, it gives nonscientists (medical doctors, for example) a starting point from which to come up with useful devices that may save our lives, and it even gives scientists a base from which they can start hypothesizing things that seems to spring up as ideas merely because they're starting with the idea of the model as truth.

But philosophically, the odds that 'the model we currently are using is even remotely similar to whatever reality is' are effectively zero. We use the model we now use because it is convenient; not because it is true. Nor even because it is close to truth. Science tells us NOTHING of what is true, nor even of what is close to truth. It merely tells us what isn't true.

This negatively-centered view of science is something I adore. It is something I am falling more and more in love with with each passing day. But I must stress again that it is very different from the 'science' of my childhood, which I view as exceedingly dogmatic and inane. So when I say that I am falling in love with science, this is the science I mean.

So, too, does this argument extend to religion. Truly, I am agnostic. But I am agnostic not because I cannot pass judgment on God's existence, but because I cannot pass judgment on anything at all! Even in science, where I implied that at least science disproved hypotheses even when it failed to ever prove anything in the least way, these disproofs are (to me) only the slightest of obstacles. There are a great many premises which must be first granted before you can even start to disprove hyptheses. My skepticism is kept at bay when it comes to negatively-centered science only in short bursts, and only by the fact that science has such an INSANEly good track record. Just the fact that I'm typing this on a laptop is incredibly god anecdotal evidence for the success of science. And it is anecdotal evidence like the inventions that surround our lives every day that compete against my skepticism against the so-called 'truth' of disproving hypotheses in negatively-centered science.

Anyway, that should make it clearwhy I am an agnostic. Really, I could not be anything but an agnostic, given the philosophical views I hold.

BUT: atheism draws me in the same way science does, but in an even stronger way, the way the anticipation of sex makes me crave women.

I'll steal an old atheist argument just to prove my point. Think of how utterly absurd it would be to say Poseidon is a true god. Think of how utterly obvious it is to be atheist with regard to Poseidon. That is how I feel with regard to the personal God of the West. The feeling of atheism is perhaps the strongest feeling I have on a regular basis. It is stronger, in fact, than any sexual or hunger urge I've ever experienced. (Maybe this is because I've never experienced true starvation, but this is immaterial to my point.) Yet as strong as those feelings of atheism are, they cannot stand up to my feelings when it comes to philosophical skepticism. I am an agnostic first, and an atheist second--even though I think my feelings on atheism are far stronger than most religious people's views on their god.



If you've read this far, then I congratulate you. Now the question is: am I just mad? Was the above completely retarded in your eyes? If so, please just tell me. I can handle being told I'm wrong, especially when I fear that that is indeed the case.

I only ask because most people don't agree with what I wrote above. In fact, most scientists I know don't agree with these things. Even when it comes to philosophers of science, I find very few people who write on themes similar to the above. Most phil of sci types tend to think the negatively-centered view of science is falsified by the fact that that's not how scientists really think. So forgive me if I fear that my opinions on these matters may be flawed in some way that I don't yet fully recognize.

Of course, all of this tirade may just be because it is Valentine's day, and I have absolutely nothing to do except write a lengthy nerdy article like this. Not to mention the lengthy public political article I wrote at eric.herboso.com earlier today. But I can't be entirely full of self-pity; at least Mary is in town. We haven't gone anywhere yet (she just flew in a few hours ago), but I plan on taking her out to see the sights of DC. I just hope I can pull her away from the religious crap like the nat'l cathedral* and catholic university long enough to see the int'l spy museum. That place sounds awesome, and I haven't yet visited.

(*: Not to say that the nat'l cathedral isn't architecturally interesting, but I think my two previous visits were more than enough for me.)


(PS: I did not even get into the idea that reality might not even have a form that any model, no matter how sophisticated, might not be able to accurately conform to the possible dataset. This concept is rather scary, and is rather difficult to comprehend at first, but the idea is that while there are an infinite number of conceivable models, there may in fact not be a model in this infinite set that corresponds to the particular data that the universe gives us through experiments. I.e., when you make a one-to-one correspondence between 'best theory' and 'current dataset', you may (not only) run out of theories before you run out of datastets (, but also run into datasets ordinally larger than any individual model can account for. See transfinity on wikipedia for details.)



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[info]hemorex
2008-02-15 06:46 pm UTC (link)
Have we talked about this before? Because the idea that human thought -in general- works off the creation of models, which are in essence wrong, but workable, is something that's bounced around my head quite a bit for the last few years. Just curious. My memory's not what it used to be, and it never even used to be good. :)

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[info]ericjherboso
2008-02-19 11:17 pm UTC (link)
It's certainly possible, though I should mention that I didn't really get to this idea until around late '01-early '02.

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[info]kevinsparakeet
2008-02-16 06:48 pm UTC (link)
Interesting views on science there. I too have a fascination with this way of thinking. It is why I decided to go into applied mathmatics as opposed to the pure branch as it involves observing the data and making models based on trends that we observe, further refining them. The same method is used in that field as you describe for science as you see it. The only thing is, we make no bones about our models being correct for real world situations, just "good enough" to stand up for certain parameters. We are always interested in further refining our models as we do not believe that the models we create are entirely complete. Mathematics is not purely a logic game for me - it has real, concrete application.

I for reasons that should be apparrent disagree with your views on religion. This argument I will leave for another time though.

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underpants
[info]ericjherboso
2008-02-19 11:28 pm UTC (link)
The difference in applied math, I think, is that you still think of making 'refinements' of models, where I instead have this idea that whatever the current model is, it is far more likely that the reality is completely and utterly different from whatever you're thinking of now.

The concept is that there are an infinte # of ways to model a set of data points, and that each workable model of these infinite choices goes in all sorts of directions. So if you see something that looks like a linear relationship, you might think: "with further data, we might find that it's really a very flat asymptotic relationship instead". Whereas if I see something that looks like a linear relationship, I might think: "with further data, we might find that the relationship is completely random, or is determined by the number of underpants in politician's washing machines at midnight next friday, or any other completely different relationship".

I know that sounds completely stupid on a first read, but consider that with an infinite number of models, and only occam's razor to choose between them (see below for my comment on occam's rather blunt razor) there is NO reason to prefer a linear model to an underpants model, except in that it helps people to make predictions that historically have proved rather true to form. But my entire point is that there are an INFINITE number of models which would have been BETTER predictors than what we happened to use. In fact, there are an infinite number of underpants models which would have predicted better than the mathematical models we currently use. If good predictive skills were the decisive factor, then I'd STILL consider underpants models to be a genuine alternative to mathematical models.

I fully realize this statement makes me look like an idiot, but I swear that I'm being completely serious about all this.

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[info]blessedlunatic
2008-02-19 02:02 am UTC (link)
Did you ever get to see the Darth Vader face on the National Cathedral?

There was a spy exhibit in the British Military Museum that I went to while I was in London. It was very cool, although it definitely was different from what I expected it to be.

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[info]ericjherboso
2008-02-19 11:29 pm UTC (link)
I've nevr seen the vader thing in person, unfortunately. But if I recall correctly, I think they placed it way in the top where no one could really see it. Or maybe that's somehing else I'm thinking of.

And, unfortunately, I didn't get to go to the spy museum this past weekend. Oh, well. Maybe next time I tour dc.

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[info]blessedlunatic
2008-02-19 11:35 pm UTC (link)
Wait, but don't you live right near DC?

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[info]ericjherboso
2008-02-20 12:13 am UTC (link)
I'm in Maryland, actually. But yeah, theoretically I can hop on the bus/metro and tour DC anytime I want. But for some reason I often find myself reading a random book on a bench down the street instead.

Remember how when I lived near the beach in Alabama, I still only went out to Dauphin Island like twice a semester? It's the same thing here. Now that I can go to the smithsonian three times a week if I wanted to, I instead waited until Mary came to visit before attempting a proper walk-through.

I think this is worthwhile proof that I'm a complete idiot.

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[info]blessedlunatic
2008-02-20 12:24 am UTC (link)
Have you at least eaten at Chipotle a couple of times? Now that I am an adult with a college degree and have the option to basically move to wherever I want once I get my shit together, the characteristics for like a place I would want to live are the following: 1) a good music scene, 2) a "blue state" kind of vibe, 3) at least one Chipotle.

And at the risk of turning this into one of those stupid comment threads that go on forever and probably would have been more efficient as like an e-mail or instant messenger exchange, how's Mary doing? I haven't talked to her in a while.

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[info]ericjherboso
2008-07-21 12:18 am UTC (link)
btw, I now nor only live within walking distance of a chipotle, but also work within walking distance of yet another chipotle. Such is the badassery of dc.

The whole 'blue state' vibe is actually better than I thought it would be. I was thinking people would be just as dumb, voting democratic solely because their parents did, and whatnot. But in dc, politics seems to be an issue that everyone talks about all of the time. Genuine debates occur everywhere, even in taxicabs. (I was previously under the impression that cab drivers avoided discussions of politics, but in dc apparently this rule doesn't hold.)

As for Mary, she just got back from San Fransisco; you really should speak with her from time to time.

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Occam's Razor
(Anonymous)
2008-02-19 09:04 pm UTC (link)
What I found missing in your description of science was any mention of Occam's Razor, i.e., the argument that when given several theories which explain the data, you are obligated to assume the simplest theory is the correct one unless there is additional data to the contrary.

This doesn't guarantee only one theory as there could be several equally simple theories, but it eliminates many theories. When we had to revise the notion that the universe revolved around the earth, it was largely due to the simplicity of the mathematics once the sun was used instead of the earth as the center of their orbits.

Also, the best science occurs not when it just explains the data, but when it predicts NEW data that we haven't yet obtained. Einstein did this spectacularly. This is where science ceases to be negative and becomes positive. It's more about prediction than explanation. Explanation is cheap. Accurate prediction is priceless.

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Re: Occam's Razor
[info]ericjherboso
2008-02-20 12:08 am UTC (link)
The reason why I did not speak on Occam's Razor during my description of the ideal science is the same reason I scrupulously avoid mathematical induction and infinitesimals when speaking on ideal mathematics.

There is, simply put, no good reason why a simpler theory is better than a more complex theory. Believing that simpler is better feels rather like blind belief to me.

That said, in physics, it has increasingly been the case that the simplest explanation generally gave the best results over time. There are many examples where a physicist would come up with a simplified way of looking at phenomena (schrodinger is a good example) that they at first considered as just an oversimplification only to later realize that the simplification brought testable hyptheses which were then verified.

But no matter how many times a simplification has led to better understanding of results, I still maintain that a simpler theory is not necessarily any better than a less simple theory, or even an extremely complex one. I fear that that, as scientists, we are being deluded by selective bias here: because no one does studies using complex theories except crazy people who never studied science fully in depth, we only see the 'hits' of good results from using simple theories. I venture to make the prediction that using complex theories would progress science just about as often, though in different directions (but I will admit that by using simpler theories, we make things easier for theorists to grasp in their merely human minds, and so perhaps any increase in scientific results from using simpler theories would be attributable to this ease of use).

I admit that I am not really presenting a good amount of proof for this, but the only way to get data on this is to have two groups of scientists, each with equal convictions and capability, with each group working under a different model--one simple, and one complex. Performing this experiment is not feasible, nor if it were would I recommend going through with it. I freely admit that using simpler theories will produce more results; but only because simpler theories are easier to hold in the mind during complex thought experiments. I truly think that using a more complex model to work from would produce approximately equal amounts of progress in science.

Occam's Razor, famous though it may be, feels rather like an instrument of faith, not science.

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Re: Occam's Razor
[info]ericjherboso
2008-02-20 12:09 am UTC (link)
As an example that goes straight to your heliocentrism example, consider the ideas on star movement that were considered before using a central sun idea. There's a rather interesting finding that showed that if you make a sphere of a certain diameter around the earth, and then inscribe it by a euclidean solid, which is itself circumscribed by another sphere, and so on, until each of the five euclidean solids are used in a certain order (descending, I think? I can't remember...) then those are the spheres by which you can make a system of spheres rotating evenly within spheres that to a great degree of accuracy shows the motion of the then known planets.

You might say that this is a rather complex procedure, but it is all a matter of perspective. Can you imagine how simple an explanation this was? It used the five fundamental solids in a compelling and easy to understand way: through alternating inscription/circumscription, and derived the movement of stars from it!

I admit that the use of simplicity in math has led to many discoveries. But we only have one set of data points: the data where we used simple math to make those discoveries. Who is to say that we would not have made other discoveries (or even the same ones) if we had used different models? It is easy to proclaim that occam's razor has an impressive record of leading science to new and better understanding. But saying that is no different than the absurd parapsychologist who uses insufficient data to try and prove that telepathy exists. We simply haven't the necessary data to come to ANY conclusion about occam's razor. And without the necessary data, the only argument left to defend occam's razor is the fact that it seems the simplest explanation of the facts we have before us. I'm sure you see the irony of that.

In conclusion, I want to firmly say that I agree with your final paragraph. Our contention is not that we put different value on accurate prediction, but that when you point to accurate prediction coming through occam's razor, I see a possibility of confirmation bias occurring. My contention is that using more complex models would give about the same levels of accuracy in prediction, minus the accuracy loss from human brains being less capable of utilizing more complex models to explain reality.

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[info]picarpo
2008-02-21 03:25 am UTC (link)
Even though I have no idea to think you're wrong, and in fact have strong evidence to think you're right (when I disagree with you, I often change my mind after reading your rebuttal), the former was indeed my reaction. Perhaps it's the style you wrote this entry in. I'm not even sure why I'm saying this, so I'll say that it's an example of the point I'm about to make. My first thought is that science is truly biased from the start. I do believe that there is a discoverable way to explain how reality works -- however, I believe that we humans are able to appreciate only a small part of it. We pursue science based on a view of what we can perceive, which is inherently biased. So I think it is natural that theories about this biased perception will themselves be biased to seem "simpler" to this same human perception. In fact, what differentiates a simple theory from a complex one? It seems to me that there are two situations. The first is that a complex theory can have everything that a simple theory has, and more -- in which case of course! we would choose the simplest theory which still has everything we need to explain what it does, with nothing extraneous. The second situation is that a complex theory is different from a simple theory -- but in this case I see no reason (speaking from my MRistic viewpoint) to call one simpler than the other, if not to again bring in this human bias.

As a second reaction, I think that I was trying to be clever, and argue with you without contradicting you. Of course you'll prove me wrong on that point as well.

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[info]ericjherboso
2008-07-21 12:33 am UTC (link)
I've been stewing over this comment of yours for quite a while, though I never got around to actually typing anything substantial in return.

After much thought, I think that the paragraph you wrote does contradict what I said in this entry, and I further think that I now agree with you.

In your 'second situation', you are right to say that there is no reason to call one purely simpler than another. I did not at first recognize this, but after much thought, it almost feels obvious. Thank you for pointing this out to me.

But when it comes to your 'first situation', I think I might now go even further. I think I was a bit naive even in just using the words 'simple' and 'complex' as I did. Previously, I was thinking that using these words could be unambiguous: a simple thing is a thing that requires less concepts to explain, while a complex thing requires more levels of nested concepts to comprehend. But after much thought, I now think that I was missing the fundamental human bias on even this description.

You say a complex theory can have everything a simpler one has, plus more. But, after much thought, I think that this, too, is a human bias.

Say, for example, that the Simple Theory consists of X and Y, while the Complex Theory consists of X, Y, and Z. Put this way, it seems rather obvious why one might be called simpler, and the other more complex. Yet, upon reflection, this is only because of how we view the constituent parts of the theories. If the entire world consisted of W, X, Y, and Z, then we might define the simple theory as -W&-Z (not W & not Z), while the complex theory is just -W.

As a result, I think it may be possible that I need to reevaluate my views on this aspect of scientific thought.

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